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Abstract
We study the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with a transmitter, a legitimate receiver, an eaves-
dropper and an external helper, each equipped with multiple antennas. The transmitter sends confidential
messages to its intended receiver, while the helper transmits jamming signals independent of the source
message to confuse the eavesdropper. The jamming signal is assumed to be treated as noise at both
the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. We obtain a closed-form expression for the structure of
the artificial noise covariance matrix that guarantees no decrease in the secrecy capacity of the wiretap
channel. We also describe how to find specific realizations of this covariance matrix expression that
provide good secrecy rate performance, even when there is no non-trivial null space between the helper
and the intended receiver. Unlike prior work, our approach considers the general MIMO case, and is not
restricted to SISO or MISO scenarios.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Recent information-theoretic research on secure communication has focused on enhancing security
at the physical layer. The wiretap channel, first introduced and studied by Wyner [1], is the most
basic physical layer model that captures the problem of communication security. This work led to the
development of the notion of perfect secrecy capacity, which quantifies the maximum rate at which a
transmitter can reliably send a secret message to its intended recipient, without it being decoded by an
eavesdropper. The Gaussian wiretap channel, in which the outputs of the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper are corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise, was studied in [2]. The secrecy capacity of
a Gaussian wiretap channel, which is in general a difficult non-convex optimization problem, has been
addressed and solved for in [3]-[7]. The secrecy capacity under an average power constraint is treated in
[4] and [5], where in [4] a beamforming approach, based on the generalized singular value decomposition
(GSVD), is proposed that achieves the secrecy capacity in the high SNR regime. In [5], we propose an
optimal power allocation that achieves the secrecy capacity of the GSVD-based multiple-input, multiple-
output (MIMO) Gaussian wiretap channel for any SNR. In [7], a closed-form expression for the secrecy
capacity is derived under a certain power-covariance constraint.
It was shown in [8] that, for a wiretap channel without feedback, a non-zero secrecy capacity can
only be obtained if the eavesdropper’s channel is of lower quality than that of the intended recipient.
Otherwise, it is infeasible to establish a secure link under Wyner’s wiretap channel model. In such
situations, one approach is to exploit user cooperation in facilitating the transmission of confidential
messages from the source to the destination. In [9]-[13], for example, a four-terminal relay-eavesdropper
channel is considered, where a source wishes to send messages to a destination while leveraging the
help of a relay/helper node to hide the messages from the eavesdropper. While the relay can assist in the
transmission of confidential messages, its computational cost may be prohibitive and there are difficulties
associated with the coding and decoding schemes at both the relay and the intended receiver. Alternatively,
a cooperating node can be used as a helper that simply transmits jamming signals, independent of the
source message, to confuse the eavesdropper and increase the range of channel conditions under which
secure communications can take place. The strategy of using a helper to improve the secrecy of the source-
destination communication is generally known as cooperative jamming [9], [11] or noise-forwarding [12]
in prior work.
In [9], the scenario where multiple single-antenna users communicate with a common receiver (i.e.,
the multiple access channel) in the presence of an eavesdropper is considered, and the optimal transmit
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3power allocation that achieves the maximum secrecy sum-rate ia obtained. The work of [9] shows that
any user prevented from transmitting based on the obtained power allocation can help increase the secrecy
rate for other users by transmitting artificial noise to the eavesdropper (cooperative jamming). In [11], a
source-destination system in the presence of multiple helpers and multiple eavesdroppers is considered,
where the helpers can transmit weighted jamming signals to degrade the eavesdropper’s ability to decode
the source. While the objective is to select the weights so as to maximize the secrecy rate under a total
power constraint, or to minimize the total power under a secrecy rate constraint, the results in [11] yield
sub-optimal weights for both single and multiple eavesdroppers, due to the assumption that the jamming
signal must be nulled at the destination. The noise forwarding scheme of [12] requires that the interferer’s
codewords be decoded by the intended receiver. A generalization of [9], [11] and [12] is proposed in
[13], in which the helper’s codewords do not have to be decoded by the receiver.
The prior work in [9]-[13] assumes single antenna nodes and models single-input, single-output (SISO)
or multiple-input, single-output (MISO) cases. A more general MIMO case with multiple cooperative
jammers was studied in [14], in which the jammers aligned their interference to lie within a pre-specified
“jamming subspace” at the receiver, but the dimensions of the subspace and the power allocation were
not optimized. In this paper, we also address the general MIMO case, where the transmitter, legitimate
receiver, eavesdropper and helper are in general all equipped with multiple antennas. The transmitter
sends confidential messages to its intended receiver, while the helper node assists the transmitter by
sending jamming signals independent of the source message to confuse the eavesdropper. While the
previous work on this problem shows the fundamental role of jamming as a means to increase secrecy
rates, it also emphasizes the fact that that non-carefully designed jamming strategies can preclude secure
communication [15].
In this work, we derive a closed-form expression for the structure of the artificial noise covariance
matrix of a cooperating jammer that guarantees no decrease in the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel,
assuming the jamming signal from the helper is treated as noise at both the intended receiver and the
eavesdropper. We describe algorithms for finding specific realizations of this covariance expression that
provide good secrecy rate performance, and show that even when there is no non-trivial nullspace between
the helper and the intended receiver, the helper can still transmit artificial noise that does not impact
the mutual information between the transmitter and the intended receiver, while decreasing the mutual
information between the transmitter and the eavesdropper. Hence, the secrecy level of the confidential
message is increased. The situation we consider is different from the one in [16], where the transmitter
itself rather than an external helper broadcasts artificial noise to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel.
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4However, both approaches are able to achieve a positive perfect secrecy rate in scenarios where the
secrecy capacity in the absence of jamming is zero.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model for
the helper-assisted Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel and formulate the problem to be solved. In Sections
III and IV, we derive the artificial noise covariance matrix that guarantees no decrease in the secrecy
capacity of the wiretap channel. Numerical results in Section V are presented to illustrate the proposed
solution. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: Throughout the paper, we use boldface uppercase letters to denote matrices. Vector-valued
random variables are written with non-boldface uppercase letters (e.g., X), while the corresponding
lowercase boldface letter (x) denotes a specific realization of the random variable. Scalar variables are
written with non-boldface (lowercase or uppercase) letters. We use (.)T to represent matrix transposition,
(.)H the Hermitian (i.e., conjugate) transpose, Tr(.) the matrix trace, E the expectation operator, I the
identity matrix, and 0 a matrix or vector with all zeros. Mutual information between the random variables
A and B is denoted by I(A;B), and CN (0, 1) represents the complex circularly symmetric Gaussian
distribution with zero mean and unit variance.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MIMO wiretap channel that includes a transmitter, an intended receiver, a helping
interferer and an eavesdropper, with nt, nr, nh and ne antennas, respectively. The transmitter sends a
confidential message to the intended receiver with the aid of the helper, in the presence of an eavesdropper.
We assume that the helper does not know the confidential message and transmits only a Gaussian jamming
signal which is not known at the intended receiver nor the eavesdropper and which is treated as noise at
both receivers. The mathematical model for this scenario is given by:
y1 = H1x1 +G2x2 + z1 (1)
y2 = H2x2 +G1x1 + z2 , (2)
where x1 is a zero-mean nt × 1 transmitted signal vector, x2 is a zero-mean nh × 1 jamming vector
transmitted by the helper, and z1 ∈ Cnr×1, z2 ∈ Cne×1 are additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vectors
at the intended receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, with i.i.d. entries distributed as CN (0, 1). The
matrices H1,G1 represent the channels from the transmitter to the intended receiver and eavesdropper,
respectively, while H2,G2 are the channels from the helper to the eavesdropper and intended receiver,
respectively. The channels are assumed to be independent of each other and full rank with arbitrary
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5dimensions. We also assume that the transmitter has full channel state information and is aware of the
effective noise covariance at both receivers, where the effective noise is the background noise plus the
received artificial noise. Both the helper and the eavesdropper are also aware of all channel matrices as
well.
The jamming signal transmitted by the helper satisfies an average power constraint:
Tr(E{X2XH2 }) = Tr(Kw) ≤ Ph (3)
where X2 is the random variable associated with the specific realization x2 and Kw is the corresponding
covariance matrix. The channel input is subject to a matrix power constraint [7], [17]
E{X1X
H
1 } = Kx  S (4)
where Kx is the input covariance matrix, S is a positive semi-definite matrix, and “” denotes that
S−Kx is positive semi-definite. Note that (4) is a rather general power constraint that subsumes many
other important power constraints, including the average total and per-antenna power constraints as special
cases. The approach developed in this paper will assume that Ph and S (or Tr(S) ≤ Pt) are fixed, and
that power is not allocated jointly between the transmitter and helper. The numerical results presented
later, however, will illustrate the trade-off associated with the power allocation when Ph + Pt is fixed.
As mentioned before, we assume Gauusian signaling for the helper. Thus the effective noise at both
receivers is Gaussian and consequently the above MIMO wiretap channel model is Gaussian. For this
case, a Gaussian input signal is the optimal choice [6], [17]. Hence, the general optimization problem is
equivalent to finding the matrices Kx  0 and Kw  0 that allow the secrecy capacity of the network
to be obtained. A matrix characterization of this optimization problem is given by:
Csec = max
Kx0,Kw0
[I(X1;Y1)− I(X1;Y2)]
= max
Kx0,Kw0
log |KxH
H
1 (G2KwG
H
2 + I)−1H1 + I|
− log |KxG
H
1 (H2KwH
H
2 + I)−1G1 + I| , (5)
where the non-convex maximization problem in carried out under the power constraints given in (3)
and (4).
Lemma 1: For a given Kw, the maximum of (5) is given by
Csec(S) =
ρ∑
i=1
log γi (6)
where γi, i = 1, · · · , ρ, are the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil
(S
1
2HH1 (G2KwG
H
2 + I)−1H1S
1
2 + I, S
1
2GH1 (H2KwH
H
2 + I)−1G1S
1
2 + I) (7)
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6that are greater than 1.
Proof: When the optimization problem in (5) is performed overKx under the matrix power constraint (4)
for a given Kw, it is equivalent to a simple MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel without a helper, where the
noise covariance matrices at the receiver and the eavesdropper are (G2KwGH2 + I) and (H2KwHH2 + I),
respectively. The above lemma is a natural extension of [7] and [17, Theorem 3] for the standard MIMO
Gaussian wiretap channel.
Note that since both elements of the pencil (7) are strictly positive definite, all of the generalized
eigenvalues are real and positive [17], [18]. In (6), a total of ρ of them are assumed to be greater than
one. Clearly, if there are no such eigenvalues, then the information signal received at the intended receiver
is a degraded version of that of the eavesdropper, and in this case the secrecy capacity is zero. Note
also that Lemma 1 only provides the secrecy capacity for the optimal Kx, but does not give an explicit
expression for this Kx. A general expression for the maximizing Kx will be given in the next section.
To solve the general optimization problem in (5), we would need to find the Kw that maximizes (6).
Unfortunately, this appears to be a very difficult problem to solve without resorting to some type of
ad hoc search. In the following we obtain a sub-optimal closed-form solution for the artificial noise
covariance matrix Kw that guarantees no decrease in the mutual information between the transmitter and
the intended receiver compared with the case where Kw = 0, while maintaining the power constraint
in (5). Hence, the new non-zero Kw will only interfere with the eavesdropper, and the secrecy level of
the confidential message will be increased. Once such a Kw is found, additional improvement in the
secrecy rate can be achieved if the transmitter updates its covariance matrix Kx for the obtained Kw.
The final secrecy rate for this method is obtained by simply computing (6) and (7) for the resulting Kw.
Note that we will not propose an iterative algorithm that would further alternate between calculating Kx
and Kw. We will see in the next section that there is no clear way to update Kw from a known non-zero
value.
III. ANALYTICAL METHOD
We begin with the case where the helper transmits no signal (Kw = 0). In this case, the communication
system is reduced to a simple MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel without helper. Based on Lemma 1, the
maximum of (5) when Kw = 0 is obtained by applying the generalized eigenvalue decomposition to the
following two Hermitian positive definite matrices [7], [17]:
S
1
2HH1 H1S
1
2 + I, S
1
2GH1 G1S
1
2 + I .
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7In particular, there exists an invertible generalized eigenvector matrix C such that [18]
CH
[
S
1
2GH1 G1S
1
2 + I
]
C = I (8)
CH
[
S
1
2HH1 H1S
1
2 + I
]
C = Λ (9)
whereΛ = diag{λ1, ..., λnt} is a positive definite diagonal matrix and λ1, ..., λnt represent the generalized
eigenvalues. Without loss of generality, we assume the generalized eigenvalues are ordered as
λ1 ≥ ... ≥ λb > 1 ≥ λb+1 ≥ ... ≥ λnt > 0
so that a total of b (0 ≤ b ≤ nt) are assumed to be greater than 1. Hence, we can write Λ as
Λ =

 Λ1 0
0 Λ2

 (10)
where Λ1 = diag{λ1, ..., λb} and Λ2 = diag{λb+1, ..., λnt}. Also, we can write C as
C = [C1 C2] (11)
where C1 is the nt× b submatrix representing the generalized eigenvectors corresponding to {λ1, ..., λb}
and C2 is the nt × (nt − b) submatrix representing the generalized eigenvectors corresponding to
{λb+1, ..., λnt}.
For the case of Kw = 0, the secrecy capacity of (5) under the matrix power constraint (4) is given by
(Lemma 1 or [17, Theorem 3]):
Csec =
b∑
i=1
log λi = log |Λ1| (12)
and the input covariance matrix K∗x that maximizes (5) is given by ([7], [17]):
K∗x = S
1
2C

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1 0
0 0

CHS 12 . (13)
Note that (13) is a general expression for the Kx that optimizes (5) for a given Kw even when Kw 6= 0,
although in this case the C will be the generalized eigenvector matrix of the pencil (7). From (9) we
note that HH1 H1 can be written as
HH1 H1 = S
−1/2

C−H

 Λ1 0
0 Λ2

C−1 − I

S−1/2 . (14)
The following lemma gives the mutual information I(X1;Y1) between the transmitter and the intended
receiver when Kw = 0 and Kx is given by (13).
Lemma 2: The following equality holds:
I(X1;Y1)|Kw=0,Kx=K∗x = log
∣∣K∗xHH1 H1 + I
∣∣ = log ∣∣(CH1 C1)−1Λ1
∣∣ . (15)
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8Proof: Following the same steps as the proof of [7, App. D] and using (13) and (14), we have
∣∣K∗xHH1 H1 + I
∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
S
1
2C

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1 0
0 0

CH ×

C−H

 Λ1 0
0 Λ2

C−1 − I

S−1/2 + I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1 0
0 0

×

 Λ1 0
0 Λ2

−

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1 0
0 0

CHC+ I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(16)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1Λ1 0
0 0

−

 I (C
H
1 C1)
−1CH1 C2
0 0

+ I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(17)
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1Λ1 −(C
H
1 C1)
−1CH1 C2
0 I


∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣(CH1 C1)−1Λ1
∣∣ (18)
where (16) follows from the fact that |AB+ I| = |BA+ I|, and (17) follows since
CHC = [C1 C2]
H [C1 C2] =

 C
H
1 C1 C
H
1 C2
CH2 C1 C
H
2 C2

 .
We now return to the general optimization problem in (5) with non-zero Kw. As the helper begins to
broadcast artificial noise, both the mutual information between the transmitter and the intended receiver
I(X1;Y1) and the mutual information between the transmitter and the eavesdropper I(X1;Y2) are in
general decreased. Both of these functions are non-increasing in Kw since
|A+B|
|B|
≥
|A+B+△|
|B+△|
when A, △  0 and B ≻ 0 [20]. A favorable choice for Kw would be one that reduces I(X1;Y2)
more than I(X1;Y1). Since the optimal solution to (5) is intractable, we propose a suboptimal approach
that introduces an additional constraint; namely, we search among those Kw matrices that guarantee no
decrease in the favorable term I(X1;Y1) while the power constraint (3) is satisfied. It should be noted
that this approach is more general than the cooperative jamming schemes proposed in [10], [11] for the
MISO case where the jamming signal is nulled out at the destination. Clearly, such sub-optimal solutions
are restricted to the case where there exists a null space between the helper and the intended receiver.
In the following, we obtain an expression that represents all Kw  0 matrices with the power constraint
Tr(Kw) = Ph that do not impact the mutual information between the transmitter and the intended receiver;
i.e.,
I(X1;Y1)|Kw0,Kx=K∗x = I(X1;Y1)|Kw=0,Kx=K∗x ,
June 4, 2018 DRAFT
9or from (15)
log
∣∣K∗xHH1 (G2KwGH2 + I)−1H1 + I
∣∣ = log ∣∣K∗xHH1 H1 + I
∣∣ = log ∣∣(CH1 C1)−1Λ1
∣∣ . (19)
Note that, without loss of generality, we have used an equality power constraint Tr(Kw) = Ph since for
the desired Kw the best performance is in general obtained when helper transmits at maximum power.
Theorem 1: AllKw  0 matrices for which log
∣∣K∗xHH1 (G2KwGH2 + I)−1H1 + I
∣∣ = log ∣∣K∗xHH1 H1 + I
∣∣ =
log
∣∣(CH1 C1)−1Λ1
∣∣ satisfy the following relation:
HH1 (G2KwG
H
2 + I)
−1H1 = S
−1/2

C−H

 Λ1 0
0 N

C−1 − I

S−1/2 (20)
where
Λ22  N  Λ2
Λ22 = C
H
2 C2 +C
H
2 C1(Λ1 −C
H
1 C1)
−1CH1 C2
(21)
and Λ1, Λ2, C, C1 and C2 are defined in (8)-(11).
Proof: In Appendix A, using similar steps as those used to obtain (18), we show that all Σ  0
matrices for which log |K∗xΣ+ I| = log
∣∣(CH1 C1)−1Λ1
∣∣ must have the following form
Σ = S−1/2

C−H

 Λ1 M
MH N

C−1 − I

S−1/2 . (22)
In the following, we obtain matrices N  0 and M and complete the proof by considering the following
specific choice for Σ:
Σ = HH1 (G2KwG
H
2 + I)
−1H1 . (23)
For the specific Σ in (23), it is evident that
0  Σ  HH1 H1. (24)
By applying the constraint Σ  HH1 H1 on (22) and using (14), it is enough to show that:
 Λ1 M
MH N

 

 Λ1 0
0 Λ2


or equivalently that 
 0 −M
−MH Λ2 −N

  0 .
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By applying the Schur Complement Lemma [18], the above relationship is true iff Λ2 − N  0 and
−M(Λ2 −N)
−1MH  0, which in turn is true only when
M = 0 (25)
Λ2 −N  0 . (26)
Applying the results of (25) and (26) in (22) for the specific choice of Σ =HH1 (G2KwGH2 + I)−1H1,
we have:
Σ = S−1/2

C−H

 Λ1 0
0 N

C−1 − I

S−1/2 . (27)
Based on (24), we also need to show that Σ  0. From (27), it is enough to show that

 Λ1 0
0 N

−CHC =

 Λ1 −C
H
1 C1 −C
H
1 C2
−CH2 C1 N−C
H
2 C2

  0 .
By applying the Schur Complement Lemma, the above relationship is true iff Λ1 − CH1 C1  0 and
N−CH2 C2 −C
H
2 C1(Λ1 −C
H
1 C1)
−1CH1 C2  0. Using Eqs. (8)-(10), it is evident that
Λ1 −C
H
1 C1 = C
H
1
[
S
1
2HH1 H1S
1
2 + I
]
C1 −C
H
1 C1 = C
H
1 S
1
2HH1 H1S
1
2C1  0
and finally the lower bound for N is given by N  CH2 C2+CH2 C1(Λ1−CH1 C1)−1CH1 C2 ≻ 0 , which
completes the proof.
It should be noted that as N→ Λ22, we have Tr(Kw) → ∞. Moreover, Tr(Kw) = 0 is achieved by
N = Λ2. Hence, for each scalar Ph, there always exists an N in the range Λ22  N  Λ2 that will lead
to a Kw that satisfies (20) with Tr(Kw) = Ph.
Thus far, we have not made any assumption on the number of antennas at each node. But it is clear
from (20) that, for example when G2 has more columns than rows, for a fixed N in the acceptable range
(21) there will be an infinite number of Kw matrices that satisfy (20) and consequently do not decrease
I(X1;Y1). In fact, in this example, a common policy for the helper is to simply transmit artificial noise
in the null space of G2. A more interesting case occurs when no such null space exists, i.e., when the
number of antennas at the helper is less than or equal to that of the intended receiver (nh ≤ nr). The
above result demonstrates the non-trivial fact that even when nh ≤ nr, it is possible to find a non-zero
jamming signal that does not impact I(X1;Y1) even when the jamming signal can not be nulled by the
channel. In the next section, we find more constructive expressions for the Kw matrices that satisfy (20)
for various combinations of the number of antennas at different nodes. In particular, we show that when
nh ≤ nr, a closed-form expression for Kw can be found.
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IV. RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
In this section, we consider all possible combinations of the number of antennas at the transmitter,
helper and intended receiver, and obtain constructive methods for computing specific Kw matrices that
satisfy (20). Such Kw will have no impact on I(X1;Y1), but will in general decrease I(X1;Y2), the
mutual information between the transmitter and the eavesdropper, compared with the case that there
is no helper. Hence, the secrecy level of the confidential message is increased. As mentioned before,
additional improvement in the secrecy rate can be achieved if the transmitter updates its covariance
matrix Kx once Kw is computed. Note, however, that such an iterative process will not be pursued
beyond updating Kx; unlike the first step, where Kw was updated from its initial value of zero, there is
no guarantee that finding a new Kw will reduce I(X1;Y2). Hence, the final secrecy rate for the proposed
method is obtained by simply computing (6) and (7) for the resulting Kw matrices derived in this section.
A. Case 1: nh ≤ min{nr, nt}
We show here that for the case where nh ≤ min{nr, nt} and for a fixed N in the acceptable range
(21), there is only one Kw matrix that satisfies (20) and consequently does not decrease I(X1;Y1). Using
the matrix inversion lemma, Eq. (20) can be written as:
HH1 (G2KwG
H
2 + I)
−1H1 = H
H
1 H1 −H
H
1 G2(G
H
2 G2 +K
−1
w )
−1GH2 H1
= S−1/2

C−H

 Λ1 0
0 N

C−1 − I

S−1/2 .
Replacing HH1 H1 with (14), we have:
HH1 G2(G
H
2 G2 +K
−1
w )
−1GH2 H1 = S
−1/2C−H

 0 0
0 Λ2 −N

C−1S−1/2 . (28)
Since we have assumed that the channels are full rank, in the case of nh ≤ nr ≤ nt or nh ≤ nt ≤ nr, it
is clear that rank(GH2 H1) = nh. Thus, from (28) we have:
(GH2 G2 +K
−1
w )
−1 = OHS−1/2C−H

 0 0
0 Λ2 −N

C−1S−1/2O (29)
where O is the right inverse of GH2 H1, which, for example when nh ≤ nr ≤ nt, can be written as
O = HH1 (H1H
H
1 )
−1G2(G
H
2 G2)
−1
. The following lemma is a direct result of Eqs. (28) and (29).
Lemma 3: For the case of nh ≤ min{nr, nt} and for a fixed N in the acceptable range (21), the
Kw  0 matrix for which (20) is satisfied and I(X1;Y1) is not decreased is given by
Kw = Q−QG
H
2 (G2QG
H
2 − I)
−1G2Q (30)
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where Q is the RHS of (29).
Proof: After applying the matrix inversion lemma on the LHS of (29), a straightforward computation
yields (30).
As is evident from Eqs. (29)-(30), we still have a design parameter, N, that should be chosen in its
acceptable range Λ22  N  Λ2 such that the power constraint Tr(Kw) = Ph is satisfied. Finding the
optimal N that minimizes I(X1;Y2) when Kx and Kw are given by (13) and (30), respectively, is as
intractable as the general optimization problem in (5). Instead, we simply restrict the N we consider to
those that can be linearly parameterized within the acceptable range, as follows:
N = Λ22 + t (Λ2 −Λ22) . (31)
Consequently the term Λ2 −N in Eq. (30) becomes
Λ2 −N = (1− t) (Λ2 −Λ22)
where the scalar 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 is chosen such that the power constraint Tr(Kw) = Ph is satisfied. Note that
as t → 0 (N → Λ22) then Tr(Kw) → ∞, and as t → 1 (N → Λ2) then Tr(Kw) → 0. Thus, we are
guaranteed that an acceptable N can be found in this way.
B. Case 2: nh > min{nr, nt}
As mentioned before, for the case of nh > nr and for a fixed N in the acceptable range (21), there are
many Kw matrices that satisfy (20) and consequently do not decrease I(X1;Y1). A common policy for
the helper in this case is to transmit artificial noise in the null space of G2. However, as (20) shows, this
policy is sufficient but it is not necessary. In other words, it is possible that the optimal Kw satisfying
(20) has elements outside the null space of G2. Because of the non-linear constraint in (20), finding the
optimal Kw is intractable. A similar discussion applies for the case of nt < nh ≤ nr.
In this section, we present an approach for computing a suitable Kw. Consider the following jamming
signal covariance matrix:
Kw = ΓΠΓ
H , (32)
where Π is a d×d positive semidefinite matrix, and Γ is an nh×d matrix. For the case of nt < nh ≤ nr
or nh > nr, we can choose Γ such that G2 Γ is orthogonal to H1K∗x
1
2 , i.e., K∗x
1
2HH1 G2 Γ = 0
¯
. For
example, Γ can be chosen as the d right singular vectors in the nullspace of K∗x
1
2HH1 G2. Since Kx will
often be rank deficient, the value of d will typically be larger than nh−nt for the case of nt < nh ≤ nr,
and larger than nh − nr for the case of nh > nr. For this choice of Γ, the resulting Kw in (32) satisfies
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(20), and doesn’t decrease I(X1;Y1) for N = Λ2, as is clear from (20). Given Γ, the choice of Π can be
made to maximize the transfer of the “information” in the helper’s jamming signal to the eavesdropper.
In particular, note that at the eavesdropper, the covariance of the helper’s jamming signal will be given
by H2ΓΠΓHHH2 . If the eigenvalue decomposition of ΓHHH2 H2Γ is written as
ΓHHH2 H2Γ = UDU
H
with U unitary and D square and diagonal, then Π can be found via waterfilling; i.e.,
Π = U∆UH ,
where ∆ =
[
ηI−D−1
]+
, the operation [A]+ zeros out any negative elements, and the water-filling level
η is chosen such that Tr(Kw) = Tr(∆) = Ph.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate our theoretical findings. In all of the following
figures, channels are assumed to be quasi-static flat Rayleigh fading and independent of each other. The
channel matrices H1 ∈ Cnr×nt and G2 ∈ Cnr×nh have i.i.d. entries distributed as CN (0, σ2d), while
G1 ∈ C
ne×nt and H2 ∈ Cne×nh have i.i.d. entries distributed as CN (0, σ2c ). In each figure, values for
the number of antennas at each node, as well as σ2d and σ2c , will be depicted. Unless otherwise indicated,
results are calculated based on an average of at least 500 independent channel realizations.
In the first example, Fig. 1, we randomly generate positive definite matrices S such that Tr(S) ≤ Pt.
For each S, we compute the secrecy capacity of the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel without helper
(Kw = 0
¯
) as given by (12). Next, using (30), we obtain a Kw with the average power constraint
Tr(Kw) = Ph that does not decrease I(X1;Y1), and then update Kx and compute Csec(S), using (6)
and (7), accordingly. Fig. 1 compares the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with (solid lines) and
without (dotted lines) the helper. Note that the vertical difference between the solid curves (about 0.6
bps/channel use) represents the role of the transmit power Pt on the secrecy capacity with helper when
Pt changes from 100 to 150 and Ph = 20. This relatively small difference indicates that, in this example,
Pt does not have a big impact on the secrecy capacity. Its role is even more negligible when Ph = 0,
where only an increase of 0.3 bps/channel use is obtained as Pt increases from 100 to 150. The role of
the helper on the other hand is significantly more important; increasing Ph from 0 to 20 while holding
Pt fixed results in an increase on the order of 3 bps/channel use. Furthermore, the use of the helper with
a total power of only 120 (Pt = 100, Ph = 20) provides significantly better secrecy performance than
not using the helper and transmitting with total power equal to 150 (Pt = 150, Ph = 0).
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In the next examples, we calculate the secrecy capacity of the proposed algorithms under the assumption
of an average power constraint Pt at the transmitter, and under the constraint that the helper does not
reduce the mutual information between the transmitter and receiver. While Eqs. (6) and (7) provide the
performance for a specific S, one must solve [17], [20, Lemma 1]
Csec(Pt) = max
S0,Tr(S)≤Pt
Csec(S) (33)
to find the secrecy capacity over all S that satisfy the average power constraint. In the examples that
follow, we perform a numerical search to solve (33) and compute the secrecy capacity.
Fig. 2 shows the secrecy capacity versus Ph for a fixed total average power Pt+Ph = 110. In this figure,
we consider a situation in which σc > σd, or in other words where the channel between the transmitter
and the intended receiver is weaker than the channel between the transmitter and the eavesdropper, and
the channel between the helper and the intended receiver is weaker than the channel between the helper
and the eavesdropper. The arrow in the figure shows the secrecy capacity without the helper (Ph = 0).
The figure shows that a helper with just a single antenna can provide a dramatic improvement in secrecy
rate with very little power allocated to the jamming signal; in fact, the optimal rate is obtained when Ph
is less than 2% of the total available transmit power. If the number of antennas at the helper increases,
a much higher secrecy rate can be obtained, but at the expense of allocating more power to the helper
and less to the signal for the desired user.
In Fig. 3, we consider a situation in which, unlike the above example, we have σd > σc. Thus,
the intended receiver, in comparison with the eavesdropper, receives a weaker information signal and a
stronger jamming signal than the eavesdropper. It might seem that in this situation, the helper cannot be
very useful, but the figure shows that even in this case we can have a notable improvement in the secrecy
rate (about 4 bps/channel use) by increasing the number of antennas at the helper, and with an appropriate
power assignment between the transmitter and the helper, without requiring extra total transmit power
for the helper node.
In Fig. 4, we consider a specific scenario where the secrecy capacity in the absence of the helper
node is zero. While channel matrices H2 and G2 are generated randomly with i.i.d. entries distributed
as CN (0, σ2c ) and CN (0, σ2d), respectively, we assume the following specific choices for H1 and G1:
H1 =

 −0.25 + 0.5i −0.35 −1.25− 0.9i
−0.4 + 0.1i −0.2 + 0.75i −i


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G1 =


2 + 0.25i 1.5 + 0.5i 2i
0.25 + 0.25i −0.7 + 1.5i 0.5 + 0.33i
−1.5 −0.5− i −2.9i

 .
Since HH1 H1  GH1 G1, all the generalized eigenvalues of the pencil
(
S
1
2HH1 H1S
1
2 + I
)
− γ
(
S
1
2GH1 G1S
1
2 + I
)
are zero for all S  0 and consequently, the secrecy capacity without helper will be zero. In this example,
we also assume that not only is the total power fixed at Pt + Ph = 110, but also the total number of
transmit antennas is fixed at nt + nh = 3. As in the other examples, the secrecy rate of the wiretap
channel is considerably improved with the helper. In this case, the best performance is obtained when
the helper has only a single antenna.
Finally, in Fig. 5, we consider the role of number of antennas at the helper, nh, in the secrecy rate for
the specific matrix power constraint S = Ptnt I. Note that the solution of Section IV-A applies for nh ≤ 3,
while the solution of Section IV-B holds for nh > 3. In all cases, we see that the secrecy rate increases
considerably as nh increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the Gaussian MIMO Wiretap channel in the presence of an external
jammer/helper, where the helper node assists the transmitter by sending artificial noise independent of
the source message to confuse the eavesdropper. The jamming signal from the helper is not required
to be decoded by the intended receiver and is treated as noise at both the intended receiver and the
eavesdropper. We obtained a closed-form relationship for the structure of the helper’s artificial noise
covariance matrix that guarantees no decrease in the mutual information between the transmitter and the
intended receiver. We showed how to find appropriate solutions within this covariance matrix framework
that provide very good secrecy rate performance, even when there is no non-trivial null space between
the helper and the intended receiver. The proposed scheme is shown to achieve a notable improvement in
secrecy rate even for a fixed average total power and a fixed total number of antennas at the transmitter
and the helper, without requiring extra power or antennas to be allocated to the helper node.
APPENDIX A
We are interested in finding a relationship that represents all matrices Σ ≻ 0 for which
log |K∗xΣ+ I| = log
∣∣(CH1 C1)−1Λ1
∣∣ , (34)
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where
K∗x = S
1
2C

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1 0
0 0

CHS 12 . (35)
Using the fact that |AB+ I| = |BA+ I|, it is clear that Σ will have the form Σ = S−
1
2C−HXC−1S−
1
2
for some matrix X = XH . Substituting this expression for Σ into (34) results in the following equation
that must be solved for X:
log
∣∣∣∣∣∣

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1 0
0 0

X+ I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= log
∣∣(CH1 C1)−1Λ1
∣∣ . (36)
Write X as X =

 X1 X2
XH2 X3

 so that we have

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1 0
0 0

X+ I =

 (C
H
1 C1)
−1X1 + I (C
H
1 C1)
−1X2
0 I

 ,
and note that the determinant of the above matrix is given by
∣∣(CH1 C1)−1X1 + I
∣∣
. By comparing this
result with (34), we see that X1 = Λ1 − (CH1 C1). Consequently, we have:
Σ = S−
1
2C−H

 Λ1 − (C
H
1 C1) X2
XH2 X3

C−1S− 12 (37)
where X2 and X3 are still unknown and must be found as described in the text. It is clear that (37) and
(22) are equivalent.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of secrecy capacity for MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with and without helper for different Pt and Ph.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the secrecy capacity for the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with and without a helper versus Ph for
different number of antennas at the helper, Pt +Ph = 110, assuming the eavesdropper’s channels are stronger than those of the
receiver (σ2d = 1, σ2c = 5).
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the secrecy capacity for the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with and without a helper versus Ph for
different number of antennas at the helper, Pt + Ph = 110, assuming the receiver’s channels are stronger than those of the
eavesdropper (σ2d = 2, σ2c = 1).
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the secrecy capacity for the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with and without a helper versus Ph for
different number of antennas at the helper, Pt + Ph = 110, and nt + nh = 3.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Number of Antennas at the Helper  nh
S
ec
re
cy
 D
at
a 
R
at
e 
bp
s/
H
z
nt=3   nr=ne=4   σd
2
=σ
c
2
=1   Pt=100   Ph=20
 
 
Without Helper
With Helper
Fig. 5. Secrecy data rate versus nh for a specific matrix power constraint S = Ptnt I.
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